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Compared to its neighbors, Sri Lanka performs well in terms
of health. Health care is provided for free in the public sec-
tor, yet households' out‐of‐pocket health expenditures are
steadily increasing. We explore whether this increase can
be explained by supply shortages and insufficient public
health care financing or whether it is rather the result of
an income‐induced demand for supplementary and higher
quality services from the private sector. We focus on total
health care expenditures and health care expenditures for
specific services such as expenses on private outpatient
treatments and expenses on laboratory and other diagnostic
services. Overall, we find little indication that limited supply
of public health care per se pushes patients into the private
sector. Yet income is identified as one key driver of rising
health care expenditures, ie, as households get richer, they
spend an increasing amount on private services suggesting
a dissatisfaction with the quality offered by the public sec-
tor. Hence, quality improvements in the public sector seem
to be necessary to ensure sustainability of the public health
care sector. If the rich and the middle class increasingly opt
out of public health care, the willingness to pay taxes to
finance the free health care policy will certainly shrink.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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2 PALLEGEDARA AND GRIMMKEYWORDS
free health care policy, health care demand, health care supply,
Sri LankaIf the health system is so good, why did the Health Minister go to Singapore for treatment?
(Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Chief Opposition Whip, Sri Lanka).1 | INTRODUCTION
Sri Lanka is one of the best health performers in the South Asian region. On average, only 30 women die for 100 000
live births in Sri Lanka, this compares to 178 and 174 women in Pakistan and India, respectively.1 The infant mortality
rate is estimated at 8 per 1000 children, which is significantly lower than Pakistan's rate of 66 and India's rate2 of 38.
These better health indicators are often related to the good accessibility of health care services, government‐funded
free health care facilities in public hospitals, and high levels of female education.3-5 Patients can in principle visit any
government hospital in the country without restriction. Almost all the medical facilities provided by the government
are supposed to be freely available for every citizen including all inpatient, outpatient, and community health services.
Yet substantial changes have been witnessed in terms of health care financing in Sri Lanka. According to our own
calculations based on household survey data, the share of out‐of‐pocket health expenditures in total households'
expenditures has increased from about 2% in 1990/1991 to almost 3.5% in 2012/2013. Rannan‐Eliya and
Sikurajapathy3 report that the households' out‐of‐pocket health care expenditures represented about 33% of
national health expenditure in 1953, 41% in 1980, and 48% in 2005. In contrast, the share of public funding for inpa-
tient care, ancillary health services such as laboratory and imaging services and medical goods dispensed to outpa-
tient have decreased6 steadily between 1990 and 2009. Govindaraj and colleagues,6 for example, report that the
share of public expenditure in ancillary outpatient health care services declined significantly from 7% in 1990 to
3% in 2009. Expenditures for medical goods declined from 28% in 1990 to 18% in 2009.
Against this background, the main objective of this study is to address the puzzle of increasing households' out‐
of‐pocket health expenditures in a context of a free health care policy. Precisely, we examine whether the declining
trend of public health care financing can explain the increasing trend of out‐of‐pocket health expenditures and the
seemingly increasing substitution of public by private health care services. This substitution is also subject of intense
debates in Sri Lankan politics. Recently, the chief opposition whip attacked the Minister of Health stating “Pharma-
cies are mushrooming around hospitals because the free health service is not as free as it seems. There are hospitals
and there are doctors, but the medication has to be bought from outside.”7
We do not only focus on total health care expenditures but also examine health care expenditures for specific
services such as expenses on private outpatient treatments, expenses on laboratory and other diagnostic services,
expenses on medicines and other pharmaceutical products, expenses on private hospitals, and expenses on specialist
consultations. We use 6 waves of household survey data covering the period 1990 to 2013 and add to these data
sets detailed information on public sector health care supply on the district level for the same period.
Our study is closely related to other papers that have explored the determinants of out‐of‐pocket health care
expenditures in high‐income countries such as in the United States,8,9 Australia,10 and Germany,11 but also in low‐
and middle‐income countries such as China,12 India,13,14 Sri Lanka,15 and Nigeria.16 This literature has also shown
that out‐of‐pocket health care expenditures can impose a significant financial burden on households resulting in cat-
astrophic health expenditures and medical impoverishment (see, for example, previous studies17-19). Several studies
highlight next to demand side factors also the importance of supply side factors such as availability of hospital beds
and doctors.15,20,21
PALLEGEDARA AND GRIMM 3The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the institutional setting and
documents the puzzle described above in more detail. It introduces in particular Sri Lanka's free health care policy
and the trends in out‐of‐pocket health care expenditures. Section 3 presents the data used in this study and dis-
cusses descriptive statistics in relation to health care expenditures and potential covariates. Section 4 discusses
the used empirical specifications. Section 5 presents the main results, and Section 6 discusses them. Section 7
concludes.2 | BACKGROUND
2.1 | The health care system in Sri Lanka
Health care in any public hospital or health clinic is free. Public hospitals are divided into 3 main levels: primary, sec-
ondary, and tertiary. Primary hospitals that are located all over the island provide basic outpatient health care. Sec-
ondary hospitals that are mainly located in semiurban areas provide basic outpatient and some inpatient health
care. Tertiary hospitals are mainly located in the larger cities and provide basic outpatient as well as specialized health
care. In total, there are 622 public hospitals that consist of 488 primary hospitals, 69 secondary hospitals, and 65 ter-
tiary hospitals.22 Public health care is financed through general tax revenues. Yet there are regularly shortages of
medicines, laboratory and other diagnostic facilities, long queues for specialized health clinics and surgeries and over-
crowded inpatient wards.23
Private health care is provided by a limited number of large private hospitals as well as private health clinics that are
mostly run by public sector doctors as a dual practice service. There are 125 private hospitals that are mainly located in
theWestern province.24 Private health clinics are located in every part of the island. They usually provide basic outpa-
tient services after the regular working hours, as most doctors work full time in public hospitals. According to
Amarasinghe and colleagues,24 87% of private health care expenditures are funded through household out‐of‐pocket
payments and only 5% and 7% are funded by private health insurance schemes and employee‐funded health schemes.
Every year, the government allocates funds in the order of 1.3% to 1.6% of GDP to public health care.25 This was
1.3% in 1990; it peaked at 1.6% in 2006 and then gradually decreased back to 1.3% in 2013. The bulk of the funding
is allocated to the Ministry of Health (62%) and provincial departments of health (DOHs) (31%). The Ministry of
Health provides health care services mainly through tertiary hospitals. Provincial hospitals (DOHs) in turn provide
their services through primary and secondary hospitals. The highest share of public sector health expenditure is still
allocated to inpatient care although it decreased from 83% in 1990 to 75% in 2013.2.2 | Trends in out‐of‐pocket health care expenditures
The data show an increasing trend of private health care usage and of out‐of‐pocket health care expenditures.23,26
Kumara and Samaratunga15 find that on average, more than 60% of households incur out‐of‐pocket health care expen-
ditures. In particular, households with elderly members and small children, and members with chronic health problems
are at a high risk to incur significant out‐of‐pocket health care expenditures. Figure 1 shows that share of household
out‐of‐pocket health care expenditures in total household expenditures significantly increased over the years.
Households spent around 2% of their total expenditure on out‐of‐pocket health expenses in 1990/1991. Until
2012/2013, this share increased to around 3%, ie, by 50%. Note that this has been a period of sustained economic
growthwith a real annual GDP per capita growth rate of roughly 4.6%.27 Figure 2 shows that income growth alone does
not seem to explain the rise in per capita out‐of‐pocket health care expenditures. Out‐of‐pocket health care expendi-
tures rose much faster than household income. Whereas between 1990 and 2012 per capita household consumption
expenditures increased by about 50%, per capita out‐of‐pocket health care expenditures increased by about 150%.
FIGURE 2 Household per capita health expenditure growth and per capita total expenditure growth between
1990/1991 and 2012/2013 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 1 The share of out‐of‐pocket health care expenditure (OOPHE) in total expenditure by Sri Lankan
households between 1990/1991 and 2012/2013 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
4 PALLEGEDARA AND GRIMM3 | DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
3.1 | Data sources
To analyze why out‐of‐pocket health care payments have risen under free health care policy, we use several data
sources. First, we use data from Household Income and Expenditure Surveys (HIESs) conducted by the Department
of Census and Statistics of Sri Lanka. HIES is a nationally representative cross‐sectional household survey started in
1980 and which since then has been conducted roughly every 5 years. Since 2006/2007, it is even conducted every
3 years in order to monitor the rapid changes of income and expenditure patterns in Sri Lanka.28 This study uses 6
waves of HIES data collected in 1990/1991, 1995/1996, 2002, 2006/2007, 2009/2010, and 2012/2013, respec-
tively. Although HIES is aimed to cover all 25 districts of Sri Lanka, several northern and eastern districts had been
PALLEGEDARA AND GRIMM 5excluded from the surveys in 1990/1991, 1995/1996, 2002, 2006/2007, and 2009/2010 due to the civil conflict
that ended only in 2009. HIES has detailed information on household expenditure including food consumption, non-
food consumption, and out‐of‐pocket expenditures for health care. Health expenditures are recorded separately by
expenditure category on a monthly basis. In addition, the survey records individual and household socio‐demographic
information. We aggregated all information at the district level to obtain a district level panel set.
Second, in order to capture the trends and patterns of the public sector health care supply and demand, we use
data from the Annual Health Statistics compiled by the Sri Lankan Ministry of Health. It gathers public sector health
data on morbidity, mortality, resource availability, and services provision annually. We use in particular district level
Annual Health Statistics data on public sector health care supply (number of hospital beds, number of doctors) and
utilization (number of outpatients attendance, number of inpatient stays).
Third, we use administrative death registry data provided by the registrar general's department of the Ministry of
Public Administration and Home Affairs.29 It covers the entire Sri Lankan population and registers every death case
that has occurred in Sri Lanka. Based on this data, we calculated annual death rates at the district level.
Hence, we combine 3 sources of data at the district level and obtain a panel data set over 25 districts covering 6
points in time: 1990/1991, 1995/1996, 2002, 2006/2007, 2009/2010, and 2012/2013. The core of our analysis
relies on a balanced panel where 8 northern and eastern districts are excluded from our analysis. It covers 17 districts
with in total 102 observations. As a robustness check, we however replicate most of our results with the unbalanced
panel of all 25 districts. The expenditure data are expressed in 2012/2013 Colombo prices.3.2 | Descriptive statistics
Figure 3 shows the trend of different categories of health care expenditures over time (in constant prices): expenses on
private outpatientmedical practitioners, payments for lab tests and other diagnostic services, spending onmedicine and
other pharmaceutical products, fees for specialist consultations, and expenses on private hospitals. According to
Figure 3, payments for private outpatient health care services constitute the largest share of out‐of‐pocket health
expenditures. Per capitamonthly average expenses on private outpatient treatments increased in real terms from about
120 Rupees to almost 150 Rupees between 1990 and 2012. The increase for some subcategories was much stronger.
Figure 4 depicts the trends and patterns of indicators reflecting the (potential) demand for health care services:
The share of children aged 0 to 5 in the total population and the share of the adult population (aged 65 and above),
the death rate per 1000 population, the number of outpatient visits per 100 000 population in public hospitals andFIGURE 3 Monthly per capita out‐of‐pocket health care expenditure by different categories [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 4 Trend and patterns of demand side variables [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
6 PALLEGEDARA AND GRIMMclinics, and the number of inpatient visits per 100 000 population in public hospitals. The data on the changes in the
age structure document the still ongoing demographic transition that has repercussions on the health care needs and
expenditures. The data also show that the outpatient and inpatient attendance rates in public hospitals significantly
increased over time as did expenditures for private health care.
Figure 5 illustrates trends and patterns of supply side indicators including the number of hospital beds per 1000
population and the number of doctors per 100 000 population in public hospitals. Figure 5A and 5B shows that both,
hospital beds and doctors, steadily increased over the years. We assume that these variables are good proxies of the
available resources in the public health sector, although they do not necessarily reflect quality improvements of care.
In the next sections, we will explore the relation between private health care expenditures and the supply and
demand for health care in more detail using multivariate regression analysis and regression‐based factor decomposi-
tions in order to identify the underlying forces of rising private health expenditures.4 | EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS
4.1 | Regression model
To identify the drivers of rising out‐of‐pocket health care expenditures over time, we start with random‐effects
regressions using the district panel data set. We focus on total out‐of‐pocket health care expenditures as well as
on its different components. The model can be written as follows.
ln Yit ¼ β0 þ βm ln Xmit þ μi þ δt þ εit; (1)
FIGURE 5 Trends and patterns of supply side variables [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
PALLEGEDARA AND GRIMM 7where lnYit stands for the log of the different health care expenditure categories in district i in period t. Xmit is a vector
of m potential demand side and supply side determinants, and βm is the vector of the associated coefficients to be
estimated. District level random effects are denoted μi. δt denotes year‐specific effects that control for all time‐
specific effects that are uniform across districts, such as the changes in the public health care policies and general
trends in the health status. εit stands for the district‐specific error term. Given the short panel and the small number
of observation units, we prefer a random‐effects model over a fixed‐effects model. The data do not contain enough
variation within districts over time that would allow us to identify the coefficients βm in a district fixed‐effects frame-
work. It implies of course to make the strong assumption that μi is uncorrelated with each explanatory variable in all
time periods. To check the robustness of the estimates, we also estimate Equation (1) on the household level control-
ling for district fixed effects.4.2 | Factor decomposition
To disentangle the contribution of each factor captured by Equation (1) to rising out‐of‐pocket health expenditures,
we use a regression‐based decomposition method proposed by Fields,30 which is an extension of Shorrocks.31 For-
mally, this decomposition can be written as follows:
ln Yit ¼ ∑kZk;it þ ZN;i þ ZT;t þ Z0;it; (2)
where Zk;it ¼ bβk ln Xk;it, ZN;i ¼ bμj·1 i ¼ jf g, ZT;t ¼ bδs·1 s ¼ tf g, and Z0;it ¼ bβ0 þbεit.
Note that bμj and bδs are estimates of the district and time effects, 1{⋅} is an index function, and bεit is the residual
from the estimation of (1). Applying the inequality decomposition, we obtain the proportional contribution Sk(y) of the
kth determinant to the variance in lnY. In principle, the decomposition can also use other inequality measures defined
over ln Y, such as variance, the squared coefficient of variation, the Gini index, or the Theil index.30,32 The propor-
tional contribution is calculated as follows.
8 PALLEGEDARA AND GRIMMSk yð Þ ¼ COV Zk; yð ÞVAR yð Þ ; SN yð Þ ¼
COV ZN;t; y
 
VAR yð Þ ; ST yð Þ ¼
COV ZT ; yð Þ
VAR yð Þ and S0 yð Þ ¼
COV Z0; yð Þ
VAR yð Þ ; (3)
where y stands for ln Yit.
The sum of all factors in (3) adds up to unity, ie,
∑Kk¼1Sk yð Þ þ SN yð Þ þ ST yð Þ þ S0 yð Þ ¼ 1: (4)
Using estimated regression coefficients of Equation (1), this decomposition estimates the contribution from each
explanatory variable to the total variance in the dependent variables across districts and over time. It is important to
note that this decomposition includes a residual component that cannot be attributed to a specific factor. Moreover,
it can only deal with linear parameter specifications, ie, interaction terms cannot be included.32,335 | RESULTS
In this section, we report the findings for total household health care expenditures per capita and all its subcategories.
We always start with the results from the estimation of Equation (1) (Table 1) and then present the results from the
factor decomposition based on Equation (2) (Table 2). Note that we include all explanatory variables in the decompo-
sition analysis including the residual to ensure that the proportional contributions add up to unity even though some
of the explanatory variables are not statistically significant in the regression analysis. Finally, we relate the results
from the regression and the decomposition to the trend in each single explanatory variable to identify the main con-
tributors to rising health care expenditures over time.
5.1 | Total household health care expenditures
Column 1 of Table 1 shows that district‐level total out‐of‐pocket health care expenditures are strongly correlated
with district‐level household total expenditure per capita that we use as a proxy for household income per capita
(“income” hereafter). This aggregate also includes health care expenditures, since we use it as a proxy for total house-
hold income per capita, yet our results hold if we re‐estimate them excluding health care expenditures from total
expenditures to address concerns regarding endogeneity. According to our estimates, an increase in income by 1%
is associated with an increase in health care expenditures by 1.7%. This elasticity implies that income alone is asso-
ciated with an increase in health care expenditures between 1990 and 2013 of 93%. Since care in the public sector is
free of charge, this increase should largely reflect an increase of spending for private health care with rising income.
All other coefficients are insignificant according to conventional levels of significance, which is at least partly due to
the limited number of data points we have. Yet, looking at the effect size alone and its sign, it can be noted that
changes in the population age composition and health care supply in a district matter for determining total health
care expenditures. Whereas a higher share of children under 5 reduces households' health care expenditures, a higher
share of elderly people (above 65) increases them. An increase in the number of beds in public hospitals per 1000 by
1% (controlling for inpatient attendance) reduces district‐level households' health care expenditures by 0.25%. Note
that these results and those that follow are not significantly different from those that we obtain if we include also the
northern and eastern districts that were the strongest hit by the civil war and for which no data are available for the
years 1990/1991, 1995/1996, 2002, 2006/2007, and 2009/2010.
The results from the decomposition in column 1 of Table 2 show that about 56% of the total variance in health
care expenditures across districts and over time can be explained by differences in per capita income. The age com-
position explains about 7%. In contrast, public sector inpatient attendance actually reduced the variability of total
health care expenditure data across districts and time. All other factors make only minor contributions to the
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PALLEGEDARA AND GRIMM 9
TABLE 2 Factor decomposition with district fixed effects
Variable
Contribution to Disparities in Outcome
THEXP PMPEXP LABEXP MEXP SCEXP PHEXP
Per capita expenditure 56.31 11.43 14.29 10.26 14.17 40.72
Child rate 5.23 0.91 0.63 2.79 5.70 0.93
Adult rate 1.53 −1.23 12.10 0.18 −6.66 −0.47
No. of beds 0.82 3.76 8.76 −5.58 −14.44 2.11
No. of doctors −0.36 −12.60 −18.82 22.70 −4.97 16.76
Outpatients 0.50 10.44 2.75 0.19 1.59 0.24
Inpatients −10.10 −0.39 0.65 −0.23 0.55 −13.06
Death rate 3.45 4.84 10.16 1.65 8.56 −2.90
Others 42.62 76.25 69.48 68.04 95.50 55.67
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Authors estimation based on HIES 1990/1991, HIES 1995/1996, HIES 2002, HIES 2006/2007, HIES 2009/2010,
HIES 2012/2013, Annual Health Statistics, Administrative data.
10 PALLEGEDARA AND GRIMMexplanation in the total variance either because they vary little across districts and time or because they have only
a small effect on health care expenditures (ie, small βm) or both. About 43% of the total variance remains in the
residual.
Linking both, the regression coefficients and the relative contributions from the decomposition with the changes
over time, our explanatory variables suggest that the increase in per capita health care expenditures is to a large
extent driven by income growth that Sri Lankans experienced over the past 25 years. Health care supply measured
through the number of beds per population (holding constant usage) has offset part of this increase. In other words,
there is little indication that a deterioration of the quantity of health care supply in the public sector has driven the
increase in health care expenditures over time. However, quality issues may of course play a role.5.2 | Expenditures for private outpatient medical practitioners
Column 2 of Table 1 shows that the expenditures for private outpatient medical practitioners are again strongly cor-
related with income and with outpatient attendance in the public sector. Income shows a positive elasticity of 0.82
and outpatient attendance in the public sector a negative elasticity. This is what we would expect: The higher the
usage of outpatient care in the public sector, the lower usage of outpatient care in the private sector. More doctors
in the public sector also imply lower expenditures for private outpatient care, but the effect is small and statistically
not significant.
The decomposition results in column 2 of Table 2 suggests that income now makes with only 11% a much
smaller contribution to the variance in the expenditures for private outpatient medical practitioners. Outpatient care
in the public sector makes a comparable contribution. The number of doctors reduces even the inequality in outpa-
tient health care expenditures in the private sector.
As before, comparing these results with the trends observed for the various explanatory variables, we can con-
clude that the rise of private outpatient care over time is mainly driven by income growth, but this effect seems to be
compensated by a very large extent by an increase in the number of doctors in the public system and the capacity of
the public sector to provide outpatient care. Figure 3 also shows that private outpatient care increased very slowly
over time and is compared to all other cost categories, rather a moderate driver of total health care expenditures
per capita over time.
PALLEGEDARA AND GRIMM 115.3 | Expenditures for lab tests and other diagnostic services in private health care
facilities
Column 3 inTable 1 shows that expenditures for lab tests and other diagnostic services in private health care facilities
are also strongly and positively correlated with income. They are also positively correlated with the death rate sug-
gesting that population ageing is an important driver of these expenses. This interpretation is supported by the signs
of the coefficients of the child ratio and the elderly ratio, respectively, even though both coefficients are not statis-
tically significant according to conventional levels of significance.
The decomposition in column 3 in Table 2 indicates that income explains about 14% in the overall inequality in
expenditures for lab tests and other diagnostic services. About 22% are due to population ageing and changes in the
death rate. Differences in the number of doctors per population had again an equalizing effect.
Combining these findings with the trends documented in Section 3 suggests that the rise in expenditures for lab
tests and other diagnostic services is due to income growth and population ageing.5.4 | Expenditures for medicines and other pharmaceutical products
Column 4 in Table 1 shows that expenditures for medicines and other pharmaceutical products are again mostly
driven by income. But they also seem to depend on health care supply characteristics. The number of hospital beds
per population is negatively associated with expenditures for medicines and other pharmaceutical products that is
plausible because medicines and other pharmaceutical products are in principle provided freely in public sector hos-
pitals. Yet these expenditures increase with the number of doctors, which seems also plausible, as they prescribe
medicines and pharmaceuticals also in their private consulting hours, and people need to buy them then at private
pharmacies by paying out of pocket.
Looking at the results in column 4 inTable 2, we can see that indeed about 10% of the inequality in expenditures
for medicines and other pharmaceutical products are explained by our proxy for income per capita, about 23% are
explained by differences in the number of medical doctors across time and districts. Conversely, the number of beds
in public sector hospitals reduces the variance in expenditures for medicines and other pharmaceutical products.
Taking these results and the trends in the explanatory variables shown in Section 3, it can be concluded that the
documented rise in expenditures for medicines and other pharmaceutical products illustrated in Figure 3 is driven
mainly by income growth and the increase in the number of doctors.5.5 | Expenditures for private specialist consultations
Column 5 in Table 1 indicates that expenditures for specialist consultations are also mainly driven by income. A 1%
increase in income leads to a 2% increase in expenditures on health specialists. This is plausible because specialist con-
sultations that are more commonly referred as “specialist channeling” are quite expensive compared to standard gen-
eral practice outpatient treatments. Richer people are more likely to use these private services, as they may value the
higher service level (less overcrowding) and shorter waiting times. The other variable that seems important is the supply
of hospital beds. More beds per 1000 population are associatedwith lower expenditures for specialists, suggesting that
with larger capacities in the public sector, the supply of specialist consultations in the public sector increases as well.
From the decomposition results shown in column 5 in Table 2, one can see that the contributions to the overall
inequality in expenditures for specialist consultations from per capita income and the number of hospital beds per
1000 population exactly offset each other. The share of children and the death rate also increase the inequality in
expenditures for specialist consultations. All remaining variables make only marginal contributions.
Taken together the regression results and the decomposition, it can be concluded that the increase in expenditures
on specialist consultations over the years can be mainly attributed to the income growth, also this effect was partly off-
set by an increase in the number of public sector facilities and hence more specialist consultations in the public sector.
12 PALLEGEDARA AND GRIMM5.6 | Expenditures for private inpatient hospital attendance
As a last cost category, we focus on expenditures for private hospitals. According to column 6 of Table 1, income
shows the strongest association. An increase of income by 1% is associated with an increase of expenditures for
private hospital attendance of almost 5%, ie, the increase in income between 1990 and 2013 alone is associated
with an increase in expenditures for private inpatient care by 262%. A sizeable income elasticity is expected for this
cost category since private inpatient care is in the given context “extremely” expensive and only high‐income
households can afford to stay in private hospitals. Also, as expected, inpatient attendance in the public sector is
associated with lower expenditures for private hospital attendance. Differences in the share of elderly persons
may again be another important factor, but the corresponding coefficient and also all others are not or only border-
line significant.
The decomposition results in column 6 of Table 2 show that income alone explains 41% of the inequality in
expenditures for private hospital attendance. Public inpatient care has an equalizing effect by reducing the variance
in expenditures. The decomposition also reveals that the number of doctors increases the variance in expenditures
for private inpatient care. As most doctors in the public sector provide health care services in their after hour work
in private hospitals, more doctors in general may also come with higher private hospital expenditures.
Combining regression and decomposition results with the trends shown in Figure 3 suggests that the rise in pri-
vate hospital expenditures is mainly due to income growth and the increase in the number of doctors. Expenditures
for private inpatient care are reduced as more public sector inpatient care is used.5.7 | Household level estimates
We also re‐estimated the above model with the household level data, ie, also exploiting the variation across
households within districts. The results are shown in Table 3. As for the subcategories expenditures are zero for
many households, we use a 2‐part model for estimation.34,35 The income elasticity of health care demand is some-
what lower than if estimated on the district level. It is still larger than one for total household health care expendi-
tures per capita and private outpatient medical practitioners, but it is smaller than one for all other categories. This is
due to the fact that in household level estimates, all households have the same weight irrespective of the size of
their health care expenditures whereas district averages are “biased” towards households with higher expenditure
levels and richer households spend larger shares of their income on these types of health care expenditures. We find
lower total household health expenditures per capita in female headed households and higher expenditures in
households with household heads that have at least attended primary or secondary education. The sign reverses
for households with university level education. Households in urban areas spend less on health care expenditures
in general but more on medicines and specialists. On the household level, we find that health care expenditures
increase in both, a higher proportion of children in the household and a higher proportion of elderly in the house-
hold. Health care expenditures per capita also increase with household size, and they increase with the district‐spe-
cific annual death rate.6 | DISCUSSION
The analysis showed that household income per capita, which we approximated by total household expenditures per
capita, are by far the most important driver of differences in total household health expenditures across districts and
over time. We find an income elasticity of 1.7% for the aggregate of all health care expenditure categories. Results
from the separate health care cost categories show that the elasticities for lab tests and other diagnostic services,
for specialist consultations and for private hospitals are even larger. The elasticity for private outpatient medical prac-
titioners is somewhat smaller. Hence, overall, this implies that expenses for health care increase over proportionally
with income. Yet, if the elasticity is estimated using the household sample instead of the district sample, the income
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14 PALLEGEDARA AND GRIMMelasticity of health care demand is somewhat lower, still larger than 1 for total household health care expenditures
per capita and expenses on private outpatient medical practitioners, but not anymore larger than 1 for all other
sub categories.
The consumers' strive for higher quality implies that “health care” has a lot in common with what is called in “Eco-
nomic Theory” a luxury good. The question whether health care is a luxury or a necessity has always been of interest
and previous studies found mixed results.36-38 While many studies estimated an income elasticity of health care
demand in developed countries, there are only a small number of studies that deal with developing countries. Similar
to our findings, a study by Khan and Mahumud,39 for instance, found that citizens of selected Southeast Asian coun-
tries consider private health care as a luxury good. Xu and colleagues40 reported that private health care (out‐of‐
pocket expenditure) is considered as a luxury good (income elasticity of 1.098) in low‐income countries and a neces-
sity (income elasticity of 0.842‐0.869) in the middle‐income countries. The fact that per capita income is the main
contributor to total out‐of‐pocket health care expenditures is in line with some previous studies.41,42 Our finding
is in contrast with the findings by Hayashi and Oyama32 who found per capita income contributes little to the vari-
ance in health care expenditures in Japan. However, it should be noted that their analysis was based on both public
and private health care expenditures not just private health care expenditures as in our case.
Our analysis also showed that the growth of public health care supply proxied by the number of beds dampened
the increase in expenditures for purchasing medicines and for specialist consultations. Interestingly, an increase in the
number of doctors rather tends to increase expenditures for some cost categories, such as medicines and private
inpatient care. This may reflect the supplier‐induced demand as doctors conduct dual practice in both fixed salary‐
based public hospitals and patient fee‐based private facilities.43-45 Nonclinical aspects of quality such as better inter-
personal communication by doctors and other health staffs and after hours of consultation (in the late afternoon and
on weekends) seem to have further pushed the demand to the private sector as soon as patients can afford. Yet there
is no systematic relationship between health care expenditures and outpatient and inpatient per population usage
rates; hence, overcrowding in the public sector as such does not seem to be an important driver of private health care
expenditures. In other words, it is more a quality than a quantity constraint.
We also found that changes in the population age composition and the crude death rate have influenced the
household health care expenditures across districts and over time. Our results suggest that, for instance, expenses
for medical laboratory tests and other diagnostic services increased with the share of older persons. Older persons
have to take regular medical tests and spend more on these services. Older persons are more likely to suffer from
chronic diseases such as heart ailments, diabetics, and hypertension and therefore need to take regular monitoring
checkups. Our results are in line with previous studies that identified population ageing as one of the main determi-
nants of out‐of‐pocket health care expenditure.46-48 The positive association with the crude death rate is another
reflection of the link between morbidity and health care expenditures.49,50
Yet we are aware of the fact that these variables may not fully capture all relevant aspects of health care quality
and quantity in the public sector.7 | CONCLUSION
Our results show that despite the free health care policy, people purchase many health care services from the private
sector. The increase in income over the past 2 decades allows people to buy higher quality, in form of supplementary
private services, characterized not necessarily only by higher clinical quality, but also other quality aspects such as
shorter waiting times, better interpersonal communication by doctors and other health staff, and cleanliness and
availability of luxurious private facilities (individual room and bed, TVs, and unrestricted visiting time).51,52
If these trends continue, they may erode the willingness to pay of the middle class and the rich to pay taxes for
public health care services as they increasingly may opt out of the public health care system. This may act as a threat
PALLEGEDARA AND GRIMM 15to the sustainability of free public health care. From a policy perspective, the government may consider improving
nonclinical aspects of public health care quality by adopting quality improvement strategies. The results have general
implications for emerging countries with a free health care policy.
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